Therefore, oral loan contracts are clearly authorized by Louisiana law. In this case, Mr. Palmisano never claimed that his alleged loan agreement with Ms. Nauman-Anderson was originally entered into on the basis of a note of guilt. According to both parties, Mr. Palmisano sent a debt to Ms. Nauman-Anderson to commemorate her loan agreement after the end of their romantic relationship. The alleged loan agreement between Mr. Palmisano and Ms. Nauman-Anderson did not require debt to be valid and enforceable. Therefore, the fact that Mr. Palmisano submitted an unsigned debt note at the time of the discovery is irrelevant to determining whether the alleged loan contract is valid and enforceable.
Therefore, this argument in support of Ms. Nauman-Anderson`s request for summary judgment is not valid. Jesco concerned an action brought by a potential debtor. In this case, however, it is an action brought by an alleged creditor. The. The R.S. 6:1122 expressly states that “[a] debtor does not maintain any action for a credit contract” (emphasized). The Jesco case does not represent the proposition that a party who wants to complain about a loan must do so on the basis of a written credit contract pursuant to the status of the Louisiana credit agreement. On the contrary, Jesco argues that a debtor cannot maintain an action against a creditor on the basis of an oral credit contract, regardless of the alleged theory of forfeiture. The clear language of the status of the Louisiana credit agreement prevents its application to The prosecution of Mr.
Palmisane. Therefore, after a thorough review of the status of the Louisiana credit agreement and its progeny, including Jesco, we find that it is not applicable to Mr. Palmisano`s application in this case.3 As a result, the court has an error in the award of summary judgment on the basis of La. R.S. 6:1122 and Jesco. Following the discovery, Ms. Nauman-Anderson filed an application for summary judgment on December 19, 2013. Ms. Nauman-Anderson`s motion for summary judgment was based entirely on the proposition that the application contract must be written and signed by both parties to constitute a feasible loan. In her submission in support of her request for summary judgment, Ms. Nauman-Anderson first argued that Mr.
Palmisano`s complaint by the status of the Louisiana credit agreement, La. R.S. 6:1122, is excluded. According to Ms. Nauman-Anderson, The Request. R.S. 6:1122, that all loan agreements are concluded in writing. Ms. Nauman-Anderson also submitted that Mr. Palmisano, given that Mr. Palmisano had submitted an unsigned note during the discovery and that the notes were enforceable only if they had been signed, as Mr. Palmisano had not submitted a written, signed and enforceable debt, could not retain his right to repay the alleged loan.
In support of her request for summary judgment, Ms. Nauman-Anderson attached several of the responses to Mr. Palmisano`s discovery, suggesting that he was unable to submit a written and signed loan agreement between the parties. Since Ms. Nauman-Anderson`s request for summary judgment was based entirely on two erroneous legal conditions, first, that La. R.S. 6:1122 applies to this action, and secondly, that his alleged loan agreement with Mr. Palmisano required a signed debt, we find that it did not comply with its burden of proof to obtain summary judgment according to the Louisiana SaGB. , the court has an error in the introduction of a summary judgment on their behalf. The applicant appealed on the claim that it was entitled to claim damages for the costs of repairing its soil. The court found that the contractor`s confession as “confirming evidence” sufficient for an oral contract for repair.